More on Abu Omar
Corriere della Sera seem to be going stong on this story: "At the end of summer 2003, CIA field agents sent new information on Abu Omar to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), the heart of the campaign against Al Qaeda. It was then - say American sources, adding new details to the revelations of the Washington Post - that US agents contacted the Italians to find out their views on a possible abduction. The contacts were technical in nature, and involved intelligence officers. According to the same sources, the CIA proposed an initiative reminiscent of the operation that targeted two Egyptians in Sweden in December 2001. The Italians would seize Abu Omar and taken him to an airport, possibly the US base at Aviano, where a CIA jet would be waiting. A few hours later, the imam would wake up in Cairo. But the plan was greeted with diffidence, and Italian intelligence officers preferred to have nothing to do with it. The Americans insisted. They wanted Abu Omar and requested a political go-ahead. There were two reasons for this. It is standard CIA practice to inform friendly governments, and the Americans were keen to avoid technical glitches. According to the American reconstruction, the request for the green light was passed by Italian intelligence through confidential channels to political authorities. In an informal reply, Rome washed its hands of the affair. The Americans could deal with Abu Omar by themselves as the Italians wanted no direct involvement. This was not formal authorisation, but neither was it an objection. Who gave the all-clear? The CIA says high-ranking intelligence officers, but other sources point to much higher levels. The CTC passed the file to the CIA’s operations division. In the procedure adopted for most of these “extraordinary renditions”, there is a preliminary inquiry. The CIA scrutinises the file submitted by the informant - in this case the CIA chief in Italy - takes legal advice, examines the options in the field and awaits a political order. In this case, as the Washington Post revealed yesterday, a high-ranking member of the National Security Council signed the order to carry out the apprehension. Meanwhile in Italy, American intelligence officers were at work. Our sources also confirm that it was the CIA station chief in Rome, whom we will call C, who pressed for the mission to be carried out. In a very effective turn of phrase, the Washington Post claims that C wanted to use the abduction to “add a notch” to his belt. Agent C has been described by those who know him as an “intelligence bureaucrat”, ready to support the CIA’s more robust operations. The international mood was on his side. It was the eve of the invasion of Iraq, fear of Al Qaeda reprisals was rife and the fundamentalists were in ferment. Washington’s hawks had their claws out and Abu Omar, as tapped telephone conversations show, appeared to know a lot. In some passages from his conversations, the Egyptian imam referred to possible attacks and exulted when other organisations carried out bombings. For agent C, he was the perfect target. Agent C made several trips to Milan to test the terrain. He did not rule out throwing Italian intelligence services off the scent. According to Washington, agent C came up against the CIA station chief for northern Italy, Robert Seldon Lady, one of the officers wanted by Italian magistrates today. Lady shared agent C’s worries about Abu Omar’s activities, and thought that he should be neutralised before he made trouble, but for Lady the kidnapping option was too risky. He thought the operation could be a disaster, as indeed turned out to be the case, and might jeopardise relations with Italian security forces, who were collaborating fully on terrorism-related investigations. Abu Omar was the focus of operations, even though he was not being followed 24 hours a day. In fact, round-the-clock tailing would only be adopted by DIGOS, the special operations branch of the Italian police, a year later for the Egyptian Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, one of the terrorists involved in the Madrid bombing. The order to go ahead arrived from CIA headquarters in Langley. In January and early February, the advance guard of the CIA’s Special Removal Unit set up its base. Meetings intensified, first at CIA facilities in Camp Peary, then at a front-line base in Europe, as the CIA’s paramilitary branch, the Special Activities Division, began to draft the details of the operation. Reinforcements arrived from Rome and it was Lady who coordinated the mission, as has emerged from the investigations of public prosecutor Armando Spataro. Lady’s direct superior, agent C, supervised. However, time began to drag as the group waited for the moment to strike. Tension built up and the operatives began to feel the stress. It may well have been the protracted preparation that led to the subsequent string of errors. On 17 February, Abu Omar was apprehended, the team split up, and Lady was left holding the smoking gun. When magistrates from Milan closed the case, he was the first in the frame. His friends have hinted that others will soon join him there." Paolo Biondani Guido Olimpio English translation by Giles Watson www.watson.it
posted by Tony @ Friday, July 08, 2005
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